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How Music Combines with Words?
Since language provides the most typical paradigm of mean­
ing, when we ask what meanings music may communicate, it will cer­
tainly be illuminative to compare these meanings with those conveyed by 
language. In particular we would want to ask an even more specific ques­
tion: how, in general, the respective meanings of music and words are re­
lated in a vocal composition.
Let us first consider a verbal text -  a poem, a passage from a play or 
religious text, or even a fragment of prose -  to which music may be com­
posed. Written on paper, it is endowed with all the meanings properly be­
longing to the words, and together with them it is constant and unique, 
always the same. But there can be many ways of saying it, especially of 
what we call artistic interpretation or recitation. These differ in respect 
to some specific sound qualities of the speech act, in the tone of voice, 
shaped and formed in a particular way. Something can be said softly or 
loudly, gently or forcefully, quickly or slowly, nervously or calmly, with 
energy or resignation -  all this, of course, with a much finer differentia­
tion and gradation than can be described in words. This adds to a text 
additional meanings -  a second layer of slightly equivocal, ambiguous, 
very often emotionally-involved senses, attitudes and valuations. Thus 
there would be two layers of meaning in words: one constant and unique, 
actually present in the written text, and the second only potentially 
there, which may appear only when the words are spoken. This second 
layer has to be formed and added to the basic text in every act of its oral 
performance and thus is obviously not constant and unique. It certainly 
has some meaning -  various interpretations may add to a text different 
precise and specific undertones, may uncover or stress certain of its as­
pects, present it in different lights and provide it with slightly different 
global meanings -  but this is definitely not any kind of meaning that is 
possessed by written words alone. There is usually nothing in this second 
layer of meaning that can be said to refer to or denote something — 
a function which words almost always discharge. And since a text can al­
ways be written down when listening to any of its utterances, nothing is 
changed in the first layer by the addition of meanings from the second 
layer. The two layers seem essentially not to interfere with each other.
Now, it is true that music has much wider possibilities than recita­
tion, both from a technical point of view -  i.e. it has much richer and su­
perior means for arranging sounds in various, diversified configurations
-  and from the point of view of its expressive capacities, which seem to be 
particularly well suited to, and capable of rendering, what we tentatively 
described as the content of the second layer of words (saying that it con­
tains slightly equivocal, ambiguous, very often emotionally-involved 
senses, attitudes and valuations). Would it therefore be unreasonable to 
assume that music composed to a verbal text is something like its recita­
tive interpretation elevated to a new dimension,1 adding to it the second 
layer of meaning, yet contrary to recitation in that it is not produced just 
for one single occasion (or a series of occasions, like an interpretation 
conceived and memorized by an actor for a series of performances), but is 
executed and fixed in notated sounds for lasting preservation?
Now it is, of course, possible that in music itself certain explicit refer­
ences -  to objects usually also hinted at in words -  are attempted. In­
stances from all ages -  from the early Renaissance through nineteenth- 
century programme music up to the present day -  are obvious and nu­
merous. Suffice it to quote just a few by way of example. ‘Descendit’ and 
‘ascendit’ in the musical setting of a mass illustrated by a descending and 
ascending melodic line, ‘Trinity’ symbolized by a momentarily three-voice 
texture in a four-voice composition, light or flood depicted in Joseph 
Haydn’s The Creation, or some even more literal meanings based on the 
imitation of actual sounds, such as the standard cuckoo, storm or battle. 
But it is by no means rare or unusual that music itself does not contain 
any explicit references of this kind. If we assume for some time in our 
analysis that there are no explicit references of this kind in music (we 
shall return to this later), then the second layer of meanings added by 
music to the first, basic layer of a text’s meanings would be the only 
meaning of music. Music and words (taken now in the more specific 
sense of ‘what is given in a written text’) would thus operate on two dif­
ferent levels, each providing meanings peculiar to itself, from two differ­
ent domains.
In a text in its written, unequivocal form we have only the first, basic 
layer of meanings, the second layer being undefined. In a vocal composi­
1 It is not suggested here that music is just an amplified and strengthened recita­
tion. Only that the general area of operation, namely sound, and the task to be per­
formed are somehow similar. But this task may be achieved in a quite different way, 
thanks to different mechanisms.
tion we have both. Consequently, much more of its content is fully given 
and determined and there is less room for different interpretations in ac­
tual performances. We can see this if we compare the literary genre in­
tended, as a rule, for performance, namely the play, with performative 
musical genres: opera and music drama. There can be many different 
stagings of Hamlet: political, existential, psychoanalytical and so forth -  
even Marxian. But an opera does not leave so much room for interpreta­
tive freedom -  the music itself gives one, quite specific, interpretation of 
the drama. Consequently, various productions of an opera are more uni­
form than those of a play, and a stage director in opera is a less impor­
tant figure than in drama. His interpretative contribution has to compete 
with that of the conductor and, above all, that of the composer, who was 
the first to interpret the drama with his/her music.
Such a picture of the relationship between the meanings of words (taken 
in the narrow sense of ‘what is given in a written text’) and of music might 
suggest that there is no substantial connection between them, i.e. they have 
really nothing in common and are independent of each other. There would 
be only a relationship of juxtaposition between them. They would operate in 
two different, separate, areas, each performing its specific task, to which it is 
particularly well suited. So let us consider the consequences of such a pic­
ture and the question as to whether it can be deemed correct.
If music cannot reach down to anything that words are about (assum­
ing that it does not resort to any sort of explicit reference) and words 
cannot reach up to that which music expresses, then this would mean 
that any words can be combined with any music, at least from the point 
of view of their respective meanings, i.e. assuming that the technical dif­
ficulties of fitting music to the syllabic structure of words could somehow 
be overcome. This is not, as one might assume, entirely in contradiction 
to reality. First of all, it goes without saying that there may be many dif­
ferent musical settings of a particular text. In fact there are texts which 
have been set to music thousands of times, namely certain religious 
texts, especially those of the constant parts of the Mass (Kyrie -  Gloria -  
Credo -  Sanctus -  Agnus Dei).
Secondly, one musical composition may serve as a musical setting for 
many texts. This seems less obvious than the first possibility, but it is 
not at all rare or exceptional. As Susanne K. Langer says:
There is a musical form anciently known as the ‘air’ [...] a simple, self-contained me­
lody, which may be played without words or sung to any verses that follow its meter.
[...] The same tune may be a drinking song, a national anthem, a ballad or a ditty.2
2 Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form (New York, 1953), 155.
Sometimes words can be written to music which was originally com­
posed as a purely instrumental composition. The well-known Polish 
singer Wojciech Młynarski wrote a humorous song about a family dinner 
using the music of the famous minuet from Luigi Boccherini’s E major 
String Quintet, Op. 13 No. 5. In the seventies and eighties there was 
a satirical programme on Polish Radio (entitled ‘60 minut na godzinę’ [60 
minutes per hour]) whose authors wrote an elaborate, amusing song us­
ing the music of the even more famous march ‘Alla Turca’ from Wolfgang 
Amadeus Mozarts A major Piano Sonata, KV 331. And the programme’s 
theme tune was based on the overture of Gioacchino Rossini’s II barbiere 
di Siviglia. People who were not fond of classical music always associated 
this tune with the programme and would never have thought that it had 
not been originally composed for it, let alone that the music did not fit. But 
even taking into account all the examples of this kind, we can hardly accept 
the claim that any music suits any given text, even assuming the absence 
of any explicit reference in the music.
Then on the other hand, we face the following problem: if we assume 
that what is conveyed by music actually has something in common with 
what the words convey, then with respect to this part of its meaning mu­
sic does not make any real contribution to the meaning of a vocal compo­
sition, since this part of meaning is already contained in the text and the 
music merely repeats it. Consequently, music actually contributes to 
a composition only as far as it is independent of and unrelated to the 
text. And when it is related, it adds nothing. This would mean that a mu­
sical setting which is said to be unusually well-suited to the words is tau­
tological and redundant, and a setting which is most obviously unrelated 
to the words, most genuinely creative and innovative.
A picture of the relationship between music and words implying such 
consequences obviously cannot be correct. But since this picture -  as 
suggested by the examples mentioned -  seems to contain a grain of truth, 
let us try to remodel it instead of casting it aside. Let us look once again 
at what music contributes to a text. At the beginning of our deliberations, 
we tentatively described the second, only potential and variable, layer of 
a text, manifesting itself through different kinds of recitation, as the layer 
in which a specific undertone is added to a text, in which some emotion­
ally-involved senses, attitudes and valuations become manifest. It was 
claimed that music enters this territory of recitation and takes over its 
function, thanks to its expressive capabilities. What music itself expresses 
is again most often described as feelings, moods and emotions. And if we 
do not want to evoke a stereotyped image of ‘romantic’, sentimental music 
and to enclose ourselves in such a domain, we should say -  again following 
Langer — that it expresses feelings understood in a very broad sense:
meaning ‘everything that can be felt’, from physical sensation, pain and comfort, 
excitement and repose, to the most complex emotions, intellectual tensions, or 
steady feeling-tones of a conscious human life.3
This may also be called the forms of human sentience or mental 
states, attitudes and processes. Obviously, music is much more powerful 
in this domain than different tones of voice in recitation. It is rather dif­
ficult to say that a tone of voice in recitation expresses something, and 
what it is, all by itself. Tone of voice is only able to add something to 
a text, and it is easier to define this layer and its role in purely formal 
terms, i.e. saying that it is just something which is added and is not in­
herent to a written text. But music definitely is able to express some­
thing by itself. Thus instead of describing merely formally the territory 
that music took over from recitation, which it expanded using new means 
and methods and over which it strengthened its grip, we can describe 
more explicitly the substance of this territory, identifying the subject of 
musical expression. We can describe it briefly as inner human life and 
then contrast it with the external world as the opposite, complementary, 
domain, which in turn is usually considered the primary field of refer­
ence of words. But if we look at what is now ascribed to music (‘inner 
life’), we see that words do not have to be, and usually are not, completely 
unrelated to this domain. There are general linguistic terms, such as 
‘sadness’, ‘happiness’, ‘ire’ or ‘melancholy’, which each denote a quite 
broad class of different feelings. Besides this, words themselves may 
have something like their own expression. I do not only mean the kind of 
expression which is usually associated with poetry and which itself con­
stitutes a difficult, complex problem. But even a quite simple and 
straightforward, unpoetic description of some situation or an account of 
some story may contain certain obvious content of mood or emotion. In 
both cases, however, feelings are referred to in either a very general or 
an indirect manner.
In the first case, when emotional terms are used, although the refer­
ence to our inner life seems to be more direct (it is referred to in explicit 
terms) it may in fact be even less precise and more vague than in the 
second case. The meaning of the word ‘sad’ consists mainly in its opposi­
tion to the word ‘happy’ (or ‘merry’). These two words divide the whole 
domain of inner experiences into two parts, with some intermediate zone 
in the middle. To say about an experience that it was sad is just to say 
that it belongs to one of the two parts, rather than to the other. More 
specific terms may divide the domain of inner experiences into more 
parts or subdivide the two general parts. But the procedure is always
3 Susanne K. Langer, Problems of Art (London, 1957), 15.
more or less similar, and each category described in words may still con­
tain countless specific experiences not at all equatable with one another.
In the second case, what is actually described is a certain situation or 
a course of actions. Feelings are conveyed only indirectly: we can only 
imagine or know from past experience how it feels in such a situation. 
The range of possible images or remembered experiences is quite broad, 
although not unlimited (in the sense that some feelings are obviously ex­
cluded). And the more specific our description of feelings becomes, the 
more bound up it is with some external things, such as the objects of feel­
ings or a kind of situation that they may be -  but are not necessarily -  
associated with. When becoming more specific, we cease to speak solely 
about feelings and begin to speak about something else as well, whereas 
music seems to somehow embody directly one specific feeling without 
committing itself to a description of anything external. Moreover, its abil­
ity to render minute nuances, shades and aspects of different feelings 
seems incomparably greater than that of words.
In view of the above, the relationship between words and music (or, 
strictly speaking, between their respective meanings) can now be pre­
sented as follows: words, besides describing objects, actions and situa­
tions, i.e. certain elements of the external world, may also say something 
about our inner experiences, but only in an approximate manner, merely 
delimiting certain regions within the domain of feelings, without reach­
ing any one specific feeling. Music, possessing greater capacities for dif­
ferentiation and being much subtler in this inner domain, articulates 
feelings more precisely and definitely. In this picture, music may be, in 
some sense, unsuited to certain words: if it is far from the area approxi­
mated by words. But even remaining within this area, and in this sense 
being suited to words, it still has a vast scope: various musical settings of 
a text may all be acceptable, even when very different. There does exist 
a certain real, substantial connection between music and words, but this 
interpretation does not imply that music only repeats what the words ar­
ticulate anyway. Being more specific, it almost always makes a genuine 
contribution.
The considerations of the foregoing paragraphs were conditioned by 
the assumption that music does not refer explicitly to anything in the 
way words usually do. But music may attempt such references. In such 
a situation, what is the relationship between the substance of words and 
that of music? If the words speak about a parrot and the music imitates 
a cuckoo, one might say that a composer was not very successful. However, 
such a situation is purely theoretical. Music, essentially without any es­
tablished denotations, is unable, in principle, to refer to anything by its 
own unaided powers and usually has to rely on the help of words in this
respect.4 Thus if music refers to something with the help of words, it 
cannot at the same time contradict them. Consequently, on this level we 
can have either no correlation at all between music and words or else 
conformity, i.e. positive correlation. Discrepancy is rather impossible. In 
the latter case (of positive correlation) music usually refers to something 
which is already hinted at in words.
Such a discrepancy might, however, be possible in the case of expres­
sive meanings, namely if the music were far-removed from the area de­
limited by the words. In a simple example, a combination of exultant, ju­
bilant music with words speaking of mourning, depression or melancholy 
would obviously be a case of the music being unsuited to the words. The 
possibility of such discrepancy shows clearly once again that what music 
expresses may have its source solely in the music itself (not in the words) 
and constitutes a real, genuine contribution of music to a vocal composition.
The present observation might suggest that the distinction between 
the referential and expressive meanings of music is coextensive with the 
distinction between those musical meanings which only echo what is 
conveyed in the words and those which really contribute some new mean­
ing to a composition. Perhaps it would even be tempting -  and perhaps 
what I have said thus far might suggest such a move -  to equate on one 
side:
4 A justification of this relatively natural and intuitively convincing claim might 
look as follows: if music does not have any established denotations then -  following 
Pierce’s classical typology -  its meanings must be either indexical or iconic. But since 
indexes always point to something that really exists and music -  just as any other art 
form -  has the character of ‘fiction’, of verisimilitude, and not of literal truth, then 
this first possibility is for music -  and for any other art form -  out of the question. 
(Cf. Krzysztof Guczalski, ‘Indeks i ikona, metafora i metonimia w muzyce’ [Index and 
icon, metaphor and metonymy in music], Muzyka 50/1 (2005), 40). Consequently, the 
meanings in music have to be iconic, i.e. based on some similarity, understood in 
a very general sense. This may be either similarity to some actual sounds or some more 
indirect analogy to other objects, processes or events. But even with respect to actual 
sounds, music has rather limited capacities for imitating them, since they usually 
have a totally different character to musical sounds: the latter have only a finite 
number of harmonic components and a discrete spectrum, the former usually have 
a continuous spectrum and infinitely many harmonic components. Consequently, the 
similarity between music and its intended referent is usually rather faint and consti­
tutes unsteady ground for producing the desired reference. Therefore iconic meanings 
of this kind can work only in combination with words that at least delimit quite close­
ly the area in which we are supposed to be looking for a referent, if not simply nam­
ing it. Even where the imitation seems to be quite close and distinctive, as in the case 
of the eternal ‘cuckoo’, it is usually backed by the appropriate title (François Coupe­
rin’s ‘Cuckoo’, Georg Friedrich Handel’s ‘The Cuckoo and the Nightingale’ or at least 
‘Summer’ by Antonio Vivaldi).
1. expressiveness and lack of reference,
2. the realm of inner experiences (or sentience),
3. the autonomous meanings of music (independent of accompanying 
words) actually contributing to a composition
and on the other side:
1. meanings with obvious, explicit reference,
2. the realm of the external, physical world,
3. meanings of music merely echoing the meanings of words, with 
their help.
But such a claim would require careful examination. Only the second 
opposition (i.e. inner experience versus external world) seems to be 
clearly defined. As for the first (expressive meanings lacking explicit ref­
erences versus obvious referential meanings), it has yet to be shown that 
in the case of expressive meaning there is no reference or denotation. It 
has only been observed that in the case of other meanings there are some 
obvious, explicit references. And if there is actually no reference in ex­
pressive meaning, if we cannot say or point out what music means in 
every particular case, then the question arises as to whether there is any 
meaning at all, and if so how it comes into existence. Finally, a further 
question related to this problem: how does music contribute any meaning 
to words if it does not have any denotation and does not refer to any­
thing?
There is also a certain problem with the third opposition (see above): 
it can only be defined with respect to music with words. If there are no 
words, all meaning is contributed by the music, so all purely instrumen­
tal music is located just on one side of this opposition. Now, the first and 
second oppositions make sense for any music, even of a purely instru­
mental kind. So if all three oppositions should coincide, we would have to 
examine whether it is true that also for the first and second oppositions 
only one side of them pertains to purely instrumental music. Further­
more, the third opposition causes some trouble even with respect to mu­
sic with words. If music contrives some referential meanings with the ob­
vious and necessary help of words, paralleling their references and thus 
‘contributing nothing’, does this mean that it makes no difference 
whether such referential meanings appear in music or not? It seems that 
music always ‘contributes something’. Consequently, if the third opposi­
tion is to have any significance and usefulness, it has to be defined much 
more carefully so that it allows for the explanation of the role of music 
when it ‘contributes nothing’.
The answer to all these questions about each opposition in turn and 
the careful examination of their interdependence would have to be a sub­
ject for another paper. But some preliminary research already completed
entitles us to proffer the following cursory conclusion: the examination of 
the relationships between three pairs of oppositions brings out examples 
located on one side according to one opposition and on the other side ac­
cording to another, i.e. contradicting their full equivalence. At the same 
time, however, the character of these counterexamples shows to what ex­
tent and under what conditions different pairs of oppositions can be 
claimed to coincide. In addition, the marginal nature of these counterex­
amples reveals the reason for our intuitive temptation to equate the 
three oppositions and confirms such an intuition in the sense that its 
claim is shown to be in principle (i.e. in a majority of cases and in the 
most essential types of situations), even though not categorically (i.e. in 
all cases), correct.
Translated by Krzysztof Guczalski
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